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flict.
The term "peace enforcement" will be used herein as the name for conflict of this type. This essay will use portions of Clausewitz's classical theory of war to characterize this new kind of conflict. Specifically, his thoughts on political objectives, military aims, and strategy will be used to help define this new style of war.
To some, the use of military force to enforce peace may be unfamiliar, and others may not willingly characterize it as a form of war. Therefore, before moving directly to the theoretical, we will define peace enforcement and support the assertion that it can be considered a form of war in Clausewitzian theory.
Peace Enforcement Defined. Most people are familiar with United Nation's peacekeeping operations. UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in his report, "An Agenda for Peace," defines peacekeeping as, "the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well." (Parsons, 204) Yet even in this definition, the word "hitherto" hints of the possibility that UN forces could be used against the will of the involved parties. This possibility is embodied in the term--peace enforcement--which, for this essay, will be defined as the use of international military forces to conclude ongoing regional hostilities without the consent of all belligerents.
Is Peace Enforcement a Form of Warfare? Clausewitz defines war as ".
an act of force to compel our enemy to do our wili."(69) If one substitutes belligerents for the term "our enemy" and the international community's for "our" in this quotation, it seems logical to presume that Clausewitz would consider peace enforcement a form of war within his own definition. The key point is that a political entity is willing to use military force to compel another entity to do something it does not wish to do.
Peace enforcement is not the first tier of efforts to bring an end to the tragic conflicts seen as part of the post cold war order. When diplomacy and economic methods have been unsuccessful, it appears that the final choice is between doing nothing and using military force to stop seemingly senseless human suffering. However, when military forces are deployed without the permission of all participants, violent conflict must be accepted as a possible outcome. Therefore, peace enforcement ultimately relies on violence to achieve its altruistic purpose.
Clausewitzian Theory and the Undertaking of Peace Enforcement Operations.
Some may find it surprising that Clausewitz's theory could be related to anything short of total war, and peace enforcement is anything but total war, at least for the international forces. The second problem with the offensive is that enforcement troops become active participants in the existing struggle.
When following a defensive strategy, the objective is to freeze the situation so the international community does not seem to be taking sides. Once offensive action is taken, the peace enforcement forces are no longer seen as being neutral. When it comes time to negotiate, who will be able to play the role of mediator? "The peacekeepers in Somalia faced a classic dilemma: Failing to retaliate for the ambush of the Pakistanis could have invited further attacks, but last week's strike threatens to draw the peacekeepers deeper into Somalia's clan warfare, " (Trimble 46) The third and final problem with an offensive strategy is the level of effort required to ensure its successful execution. Clausewitz correctly pointed out that this strategy could only be pursued by the strong. (358) Therefore, this option will require a larger, better equipped force. Also, international forces can expect more casualties which could have strong political repercussions. Offensive action will also require significantly increased logistical support, better coordination between multinational forces and robust command and control. The United Nations does not possess large standing forces, inherent logistical capability, or well developed command and control resources. What is more, individual nations do not seem enthusiastic about paying for the UN to acquire them. Therefore, offensive peace enforcement operations will likely fall to regional or coalition alliances as seen in Desert Storm.
Whether the offense or defense is chosen, one observation can be made.
Clausewitz said, "the best strategy is always to be very strong; first in general, and then at the decisive point." (204) The international community must make sure that forces are committed in such number and capability that the outcome of any operation is never in question. Any setback will have extremely serious consequences for the peace enforcement effort. Quoting
Clausewitz again, "One country may support another's cause, but will never take it so seriously as it takes its own."(603) Thus, national support for international efforts will be extremely fickle unless a vital national interest is at stake. US public reaction to the recent loss in Somalia is a good example of this phenomenon.
Conclusions.
Peace enforcement is significantly different than peacekeeping for two very important reasons. In peacekeeping, the belligerents have tentatively agreed to stop fighting, and what is more important, they have agreed to let international forces help maintain some kind of cease fire.
Peace enforcement operations are, by definition, to be undertaken to stop fighting between people that do not see the need for peace. While peacekeeping forces may be faced with violence, peace enforcement relies on violence.
The fact that peace enforcement relies on violence means that a decision to place forces in these kinds of situations should be considered with the same gravity as a decision to go to war. Clausewitz's theory of war can help with the decision, and just as importantly, help with the strategic planning once the decision is made.
The political objective must always be the focus.
Is there a national interest, and how strong is that interest? Even with a valid political objective, the crucial problem is the identification of a military aim that really contributes toward that objective. Not only must a military aim exist, it must be achievable at a level of effort that matches the defining national interest. Leaders must resist the urge to deploy military forces into a peace enforcement environment just because nothing else seems possible and something has to be done.
Not only must there be an achievable, meaningful military aim, but an overall strategy needs to be developed. Normally, the military will be used to provide an opportunity to use other tools to fix the real problem. Military strategy is important, but it will not be sufficient alone.
In general, a defensive strategy has the most advantages for supporting normal peace enforcement political objectives. However, offensive strategies may be appropriate in some situations. In either case, international forces should be robust, and they will likely be committed for a long term effort.
This means that peace enforcement operations will be significantly more expensive than peacekeeping.
Since peace enforcement operations are a form of warfare, it would seem that they might best be accomplished by regional organizations or ad hoc coalitions. There are two reasons for this. First, the UN does not have an appropriate standing force, the logistics, or the command and control to direct operations of this type. Second, it will be very difficult to maintain a sense of neutrality for peace enforcement operations. By all accounts, neutrality is very important to peacekeeping activities.
Ruttler lO
The concept of letting regional/ad hoc coalitions do peace enforcement and letting the UN concentrate on peacekeeping creates an interesting paradigm for looking at these situations. Assuming a coalition can work through the process of defining a political objective, military aim, and strategy for a particular problem area. The coalition could then undertake a peace enforcement operation to achieve an identifiable military objective. Successful completion of the specific military objective provides the coalition with a built-ln exit strategy. Upon successful completion, the peace enforcement troops could be replaced by a UN peacekeeping force if the situation appears to be stabilized. Using this paradigm, the UN could emphasize peacekeeping efforts where it has had some success. Regional organizations would develop and fight the combat forces necessary for peace enforcement operations.
It is very tempting to get involved in peace enforcement situations because the conditions are so appalling. However, it will be very difficult to find an affordable, achievable military aim that will resolve the problem's root cause. If a valid aim can be identified, a decision to become involved in peace enforcement operations should be considered with the same gravity as a declaration of war.
